I know the only thing people want to talk about now is Trump, but here is a parting review of Obama in Asia. I wrote this a few weeks ago for the Lowy Institute. All in all, I’d say he did about as well as you could expect.
Yes, he didn’t prevent North Korea from getting a nuclear weapon and missile, but no one knows how to do that barring kinetic action which is off the table because of South Korea’s ridiculous decision to place its capital, and allow it to flourish, just 30 miles from the border. And no he didn’t slow China’s rise, but no president could do that without kinetic action either. And that’s even crazier than bombing North Korea.
There are no good solutions to our challenges out here, just as there were none to communist power in the 1950s. Hawks calling for ‘toughness’ and ‘leadership’ should remember that rollback was a catastrophe (in the Korean War) that almost ignited WWIII. We then settled for ‘hanging tough’ until communist power imploded, which it did. The contemporary Asian analogue of hanging tough is Obama’s ‘strategic patience.’ Everyone criticized it, but no one has a better option that isn’t hugely risky. So stop complaining about strategic patience until you’ve got a better, genuinely workable idea.
The full essay follows the jump.
As US President Barack Obama leaves office, he imparts his successor a solid framework in northeast Asia, and decent relationships with its players, barring, of course, the extreme outlier of North Korea. The following is general overview of his measured success:
Regional Context: the Pivot
The broad framework of the Obama administration in East Asia has been the ‘rebalance’ or ‘pivot.’ The United States would devote greater attention to Asia given its expanding weight in the global economy, particularly because of the rise of China and India. Those two, plus Japan, Indonesia, South Korea, and Taiwan, represent some of world’s largest countries and economies. This clustered dynamism – what Thomas Barnett calls the ‘new core’ of the world economy – suggests that the US pay greater attention. Many also suspect that the pivot was a credible excuse for the US to disengage somewhat from the Middle East. Obama clearly wanted to retrench from that area, or at least wind down US wars there. Declaiming a need to focus on the far weightier region of East Asia provided good cover for that.
The administration’s follow-through suggests more than such cynicism however. The pivot’s core is the military rebalance of 60% of US navy and air force assets to the region by 2020. Hence, the Chinese frequently describe the pivot as containment. But Obama has tried to emphasize diplomatic and economic components as well. I am skeptical these efforts will succeed. I do not believe Americans care enough about Asia for a major reorientation of US foreign policy away from Europe and the Middle East. But the Obama administration has wrapped the military rebalance in a larger effort in order to suggest it is more than just balancing China.
Diplomatically, the Obama administration tried much harder than the previous two administrations to participate in regional relations. He or major figures in his administrations regularly attended regional meetings and organizations, and otherwise showed the flag. Obama reconfirmed the flagging alliances with Japan and Korea and paid more attention to southeast Asia than probably any other administration. The US signed ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009. Multilateralism and dense networking replaced the ‘assertive unilateralism’ of the previous George Bush (and likely of the coming Donald Trump) administration.
Economically, Obama promoted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade deal to deepen US commitment to regional multilateral frameworks illustrating the US as a ‘Pacific power.’ TPP would also counter-balance the economic appeal of China, which Beijing uses as coercive leverage against small regional exporters like the Philippines and South Korea. TPP is more liberal than the Chinese counter-offer – the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – and would cement a US counter-structure to emerging Chinese regional leadership. It is already a great disappointment that Trump will abandon TPP, as that will only worsen Beijing’s perception that the pivot is just containment.
The Obama administration maintained a skeptical, status quo posture toward China, which, given its enormous power in the system now, is probably about as much as one might expect from an American administration. The US cannot direct internal events in China – it cannot drive democratization, economic liberalization, or human rights respect – and ceased to badger Beijing on such topics. It respected the good-enough status quo on Taiwan and pushed Beijing mildly and responsibly on North Korean behavior. It mostly avoided the temptation of provoking trade conflicts with Beijing over currency manipulation or widespread crony mercantilism, instead cleaving to the WTO where possible to push these issues. Obama even pulled China into a climate change deal, a major concession from the world’s worst polluter. Nonetheless he made sure that the American military lead over China remains substantial.
If this seems blasé or uninspired, one need only look at Donald Trump’s recklessness to see how wise managing China’s rise is, rather than challenging it. Trump has already flirted with a trade war and some kind of greater recognition of Taiwan – neither of which are necessary, both of which are provocative. Taiwan operates well-enough under the polite fiction of the ‘One China’ policy, while a trade war will balloon US consumer prices, badly hurting Trump’s downscale ‘Walmart voters.’ The US should indeed tangle with China if necessary to defend Taiwan, but there is no reason for the US to make this into an issue when it is not one. Pointlessly provoking China on such issues will also cost the US any cooperation on other issues, most obviously North Korea.
The US relationship with Japan improved significantly under Obama. In Shinzo Abe, he seems to have found another mature democratic leader with a wider vision of the region. Under Obama, the depth and reach of the alliance was confirmed; there will be no serious democratic response to China’s rise without a tight, active US-Japan alliance, a point both seem to recognize. This was symbolically illustrated in Obama’s visit to Hiroshima and Abe’s to Pearl Harbor. More practically, Obama supported the reinterpretation of the Japanese constitution to permit greater regional Japanese military engagement. Obama also helped Japan smooth over relations with South Korea, where a long-running debate over how to interpret Japanese colonialism has roiled bilateral relations.
As with Japan, the Obama administration took pains to tighten things up. George Bush had been wildly unpopular in South Korea. Obama’s low-key approach went over well. The alliance was firmed up. The South Korean left’s anti-Americanism lost much of its force with the new president. South Korea’s two presidents during Obama’s term even spoke before Congress. Most critically, the US defense guarantee against North Korea held firm. The US did push South Korea toward more hawkish positions on North Korea – such as the closure of the Kaesong Industrial Zone and the installation of US missile defense. But this was done pragmatically, after the public debate in Korea had mostly come around. There were no grand, polarizing declarations – like the ‘Axis of Evil’ – which make Koreans so uncomfortable with the alliance’ inherent asymmetry. Economically, Obama supported a free-trade agreement between the two states, while diplomatically, Obama provided political cover for improving relations with Japan (although that is once again under strain).
Despite connecting with and improving relations between other authoritarian regimes (Cuba, Iran, Myanmar), Obama was unable deliver North Korea. He maintained for close to his entire presidency a policy of ‘strategic patience.’ This has been widely criticized but unfairly to mind. Obama pursued tough sanctions in response to North Korean nuclear testing and tied American responses to North Korean behavior. Missile defense, for example, only became a major issue after Pyongyang made clear that it would missilize regardless of outside opinion. Obama also reached out to China for help, only to be rebuffed there too. If China and North Korea will give Obama nothing, no matter the flexibility he offers, I see little reason to criticize him or strategic patience. Other alternatives come with major downsides – kinetic action risks war, targeting Chinese banks hiding Northern funds risks a major showdown with China, and so on. North Korea has been a nut impossible to crack for every American president. I see no reason to judge Obama too harshly on that score.
All in all, Obama’s legacy here is a good one – a B+ if we had to give a grade. He pulled the US toward the world’s most vibrant region. He firmed up alliances and relationships on the skids after Bush’s divisive presidency. He held a reasonable line with challengers like China and North Korea, responding when necessary but not taking unnecessary chances, as Trump already seems to be doing. He pushed prosperity-enhancing trade deals, which Asia’s mercantilist elites rarely propose themselves. This was a business-like foreign policy for a business-like presidency. Hardly inspirational, but given Bush’s divisive ideological posturing and Trump’s reckless theatricality, I bet historians will see Obama’s mature presidency as a high point for US relations with the region.